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GRApE GRUbbERS: 
ThE CASE AGAiNST 
WiNE iNdUSTRy 
REREGUlATioN
The success of  the free market Australian wine industry is threatened  
by renewed industry-demands for government assistance argue  
Jeffrey Gow and bligh Grant
Where there is plenty of wine,  
sorrow and worry take wing. 
—Anonymous
The Australian wine industry has been one of the most celebrated economic success stories in recent history. From 1990–91 to 2007–08, the total vine 
bearing area of grapes increased from some 61,000 
hectares to 166,000 hectares, with production 
expanding from 346 million litres to 1.3 billion 
litres. Export volume increased from 57 million 
litres to a little over 714 million litres in the same 
time period, with the value of exports rising from 
$180 million to $2.7 billion. And most of us 
have been drinking for Australia, with per capita 
domestic consumption increasing from 18 litres 
to 29 litres per annum.1
Nor has this been merely a quantum expansion 
in industry size. Yes, the number of wineries 
increased from some 600 in 1990–91 to almost 
1,900 in 2004–05.2 More importantly, both 
grape growing and wine production are now 
dispersed across a broad area of the country, with 
the Australian Bureau of Agricultural Economics 
recently listing no fewer than 86 wine producing 
regions and as many subregions.3 This stands in 
stark contrast to the malaise often presented as 
typical of rural and regional Australia, of struggling 
and dying communities, of family farms collapsing, 
and of under-funded government services. 
This latter portrait does have some credibility 
statistically—for example, between 1970 and 
1996, the number of farms in Australia decreased 
from approximately 250,000 to 140,000.4 Further, 
the mean size of the remaining farms increased 
from approximately 1,858 hectares in 1960 to 
2,834 hectares in 1996.5 Both grape growing and 
wine making have bucked these trends, but the 
boom has led to a new set of problems for the 
wine industry.
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The wine bust? And the proposed 
solution
Although the wine crush continued to increase 
from 2006–07 to 2007–08, the value of wine sold 
domestically declined by 4% in the same year. 
At the same time, the figures for exports became 
increasingly worrying, with overall quantity 
dropping 9.2% over the same year, and the unit 
value decreasing from $5.17 per litre in 2000–01 
to a projected $3.51 for 2010–11. And yes, we 
are drinking a lot more New Zealand Sauvignon 
Blanc (and other imported wines), with the 
value of imported wine increasing by 40.8% 
from 2006–07 to 2007–08, with imported wine 
projected to reach 18% of domestic consumption 
by 2013–14.6
The Australian Bureau of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics (ABARE) has recognised the 
multi-dimensional nature of the problem. Several 
reports over a number of years cite an increase in 
global competition, changing drinking patterns 
in major export markets, and a strong Australian 
currency as contributing factors. The industry’s 
response has been somewhat shrill. For example, 
in the Summer 2009-10 issue of the Winemakers’ 
Federation of Australia (WFA) newsletter 
Winescope, WFA CEO Stephen Strachan stated 
that the industry had to address three problems: 
1.  to protect the fundamental strength of the 
Australian wine industry—the ability of 
industry to make choices and be innovative
2.  to protect and enhance what has been left to 
us by generations of winemakers, vignerons, 
researchers and entrepreneurs, and 
3.  to protect the natural assets that we have 
been left.7 
However, Strachan also called for increased 
government regulation of the industry, stating 
that the ability to sell an alcoholic product is a 
privilege, not a right, and that two of the most 
heavily regulated markets in the world—Canada 
and Sweden—are also the most profitable. He 
believes that it is time to install barriers that 
protect profit maximisers and avoid the ‘white shoe 
brigade’ while fostering true industry innovators.8 
This pro-regulatory sentiment echoed previous 
calls by key industry players—including Doug 
Lehmann of Peter Lehmann Wines—for a vine 
pull scheme (VPS) of 20,000–40,000 hectares of 
vines, equating to 270,000 to 500,000 tonnes of 
grapes (amounting to 20 million–40 million cases 
of wine).9
In line with this pro-regulatory sentiment, on 
10 November 2009 four pivotal institutions of 
the Australian wine industry—the Winemakers’ 
Federation of Australia (WFA) the Wine Grape 
Growers’ Association (WGGA), the Australian 
Wine and Brandy Corporation (AWBC) and 
the Grape and Wine Research and Development 
Corporation (GWRDC)—released two 
documents, a joint statement ‘Wine industry 
must confront the reality of oversupply,’ which 
outlined a Wine Restructuring Action Agenda 
(WRAA),10 and a Supporting Report, which 
contained an analysis of the industry. Specifically, 
the Supporting Report identified six ‘key drivers’ 
behind the WRAA: 
1.  Australia’s wine oversupply exceeds 100 
million cases and at the current production 
rate this will more than double in three 
years.
2.  The scale of the problem is such that we 
cannot expect normal market forces or 
external factors to solve it.
3.  Even ambitious sales growth ambitions in 
new markets would eliminate less than a 
quarter of the oversupply.
4.  The combined impact of drought, water 
shortages and climate change would over 
time eliminate less than one-tenth of the 
oversupply. 
5.  Too much current activity is not viable 
in terms of competitiveness, margins and 
target market demand and the problems 
relate both to demand and supply.11 
Moreover, the Supporting Report claimed 
that market signals continued to be distorted in 
the Australian industry due to several factors, 
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including multi-year set price contracts, high 
sunk-capital costs, the unintended application 
of the WET (Wine Equalisation Tax) rebate and 
unrealistic expectations of market growth.12 
The Wine Restructuring Action Agenda 
(WRAA) contained four immediate 
recommendations:
1.  From 23 November 2009, detailed and 
confidential supply data summaries will 
be provided to regional associations. These 
will examine each region in isolation and in 
relation to the national picture, with a focus 
on levels and patterns of viability.
2.  From 30 January 2010, a package of tools 
will be available to help individual vineyard 
operators assess their performance and 
viability. This will include: a checklist; an 
upgraded Deloitte Ready Reckoner to assess 
winery profitability by market, channel 
and price point; and an upgraded Vinebiz 
program to assess vineyard profitability.
3.  From early next year, briefings will be held 
in 14 regional centres (covering all states) 
to discuss regional data and issues and offer 
business stress testing to assist with decision 
making. The federal government has been 
approached to help facilitate this initiative, 
and state input is being sought.
4.  WFA and WGGA will hold discussions with 
the federal government about improved exit 
packages for growers and small wineries 
seeking to leave the industry along the 
lines of drought and small block irrigator 
exit packages. Discussions also will be held 
with state government agencies with regard 
to alternative land use options in wine 
regions.13 
As such, while the WRAA included 
recommendations for a region-based analysis 
of farm profitability for grape growers (points 1 
to 3 above), it also explicitly included a call for 
government support in the form of exit strategies 
for grape-growers (point 4 above). This level 
of government intervention into agricultural 
commodity production is hardly without 
precedent but has been rare in the recent past. 
The broad theoretical reasons for removing the 
option of market intervention from the armoury 
of policy options are well documented. However, 
the immediate question is to what extent would 
we expect such a scheme to work? To answer this, 
we look at the last time government intervened 
in the wine industry with the Vine Pull Scheme 
(VPS) of 1985–87.
All that you can’t leave behind: the 1985–
87 VPS
Initially intended only for the dried fruit vine 
industry, the 1985–87 VPS spilled over into the 
wine-grape sector due to the McKay Inquiry into 
grape production, which had been conducted at 
the same time. The scheme was announced on 
26 March 1985, with the then Commonwealth 
Minister for Primary Industry stating that there 
was a need for structural adjustment of the 
industry ‘because of a massive over-supply on 
world markets and high domestic production’14—
precisely the same core reasons identified by 
current industry players in the WRAA. Eventually, 
a total of approximately $8.8 million was spent by 
the Commonwealth and three state governments 
(South Australia, Victoria and Queensland) to 
implement the scheme, with the vast majority 
($6.2 million) being spent on wine grape removal 
in South Australia. With the completion of the 
scheme, 2,700 hectares (or 8% of annual winery 
intake) was removed from the national crush. By 
contrast, 802 hectares (a mere 3%) of dried fruit 
vine was removed from production.
In their assessment of the scheme published 
in 1991, Jeff Gow, Geoff Kaine, and Warren 
Musgrave of the Rural Development Centre 
(RDC) at the University of New England were 
highly critical of the overall impact of the policy.15 
They argued that after taking into account the 
‘grubbings’ (or the grapes removed because of 
vine age, changes in demand, etc.), ‘the net effect 
of the scheme was at most to increase grubbings 
by only 400 hectares’ or approximately 1.5% of 
annual winery intake. Further, they argued that 
‘it seems difficult to avoid drawing the conclusion 
that the primary impact of the scheme was to 
bring forward intended grubbings of aged vines 
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which were nearing the end of their productive 
life.’16 Moreover, while the VPS was designed to 
assist the dried fruit industry, only 22% of funds 
were directed to this goal, principally because 
of an upswing in global demand for dried fruits 
when the scheme commenced.
The report offered several observations 
regarding why the scheme faltered, particularly 
in relation to the dried fruit vines. First, fruit 
production by vines is inherently unresponsive 
to market signals (despite the fickle nature of 
the market) because the planning horizon of 
production will always be some 40 years—the 
producing life of a vine. As such, producers are 
better off taking a reduced price—even a price 
that falls well below the cost of production—for 
several consecutive years because the term of 
investment is so long.
Second, this structure of inherent 
unresponsiveness was exacerbated due to 
government regulation at the time. This included 
an exemption from section 45 of the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (the section prohibiting price 
fixing, monopolisation, and exclusive dealing) 
such that a sophisticated two-price scheme 
could be put in place. The scheme was designed 
to equalise the price received from export and 
domestic markets via a levy on domestic sales 
of dried fruit, which was then redistributed to 
producers.
Third, grape growing was overseen by two 
separate bureaucracies (the Australian Dried Vine 
Fruits Association domestically and the Australian 
Dried Fruits Corporation for export sales and 
marketing, in ‘single desk’ mode). Further, 
sultana producers also benefited from federal 
government underwriting, which guaranteed a 
minimum return on dried sultana production 
equal to 80% of an estimated average of 
equalised returns over the previous three seasons. 
These extreme levels of protection significantly 
insulated growers from price signals.
Finally, the RDC report noted that, in 
contrast to the ineffectual result with respect to 
dried fruit, the scheme did result in some multi-
purpose wine grapes being pulled that were used 
for wines that ‘certainly appear[ed] to be in long 
term decline,’ namely ‘those varieties used in 
fortified and table red wines.’17
Yet it is not so much in the bottom-line 
assessment of the 1985–87 VPS that the lessons 
for today’s wine industry lies; rather, it is in the 
unintended consequences of policy that marked 
this particular episode of government intervention 
into agricultural commodity production. The 
scheme was star-crossed from the outset. Both 
the NSW Department of Agriculture and the SA 
Department of Agriculture cautioned against the 
scheme’s implementation, the former asserting 
that ‘apart from the problems of distorting the use 
of resources in favour of the underwritten resource, 
there is no guarantee that assistance distributed 
on the basis of resource-use will correspond to 
the welfare objectives of the Government.’ One 
of the main points to be derived from the RDC 
analysis is that in “picking losers” by way of a VPS 
confines the industry to the farms that remain, 
rather than taking the more considered approach 
of adjustment over time. The NSW Department 
of Agriculture realised that any VPS was in danger 
of damaging industry infrastructure, and this 
point is reinforced by experience overseas.18
In offering an assessment of the adjustment (or 
welfare) objective of the 1985–87 VPS, the RDC 
report found that while many grape-growing 
enterprises were ‘uneconomic’ when assessed 
from the perspective of grape-growing only, this 
was a surprisingly small percentage of producers. 
For example, in their overview of Murray River 
irrigation published only two years before the VPS 
Scheme was initiated, Dwyer Leslie/Maunsell 
found that 37% of growers in the Riverland 
did not depend ‘primarily on the farm for their 
income’ and that these growers were ‘identified 
as either salaried professionals (e.g. solicitors), 
retired and semi-retired individuals and hobby 
farmers.’19 Moreover, equity levels of these farms 
was high, with only 4% having an equity level less 
than 50%, with an average of 77% for medium-
Fruit production by vines is inherently 
unresponsive to market signals… 
because the planning horizon of  
production will always be some 40 
years—the producing life of  a vine.
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sized grape blocks. They cited another study 
conducted by Menzies and Grey in 1984 that 
found that 40% of heads of households earned 
income from activities apart from their farming 
enterprises.20 Dwyer Leslie/Maunsell concluded 
that the requirement for any type of welfare 
assistance for Riverland farmers was less than in 
other areas: Many producers effectively operated 
mixed businesses, with a variety of on-farm and 
off-farm income streams.
The RDC report also illustrated how the 
1985–87 VPS tripped up on its own methodology: 
A foundational element of the application of the 
scheme was land area—assistance payments were 
acreage-based. Yet two variables immediately 
confounded this seemingly obvious choice of 
definition so as to render it simplistic. The first was 
that yield per acre is variable by variety of grape: 
Muscat Gordo Blanco yielded approximately 40 
tonnes per hectare compared to the Shiraz’s six 
tonnes per hectare. Although the Shiraz brought 
a higher price per tonne as a varietal in its own 
right, this price would rarely exceed 50% more 
than the cheaper varieties. As such, ‘an assistance 
differential of over 600% would be necessary to 
make them indifferent to pulling either variety.’21
Post-facto, a newly-elected Australian Labor 
government found itself giving money to 
commercial grape growers for doing what they 
were going to do anyway. Twenty-five years 
later the same mistake may be repeated. Because 
the VPS ended up being a blanket scheme, 
the Commonwealth was also subsidising the 
viticultural ‘lifestyle’ and ‘hobby’ farms of some 
urban and rural professionals.
The RDC Report summed up the 1985-87 
intervention:
In short, the Vine Pull Scheme was 
prompted by a temporary, albeit 
prolonged, decline in world prices ... 
In these circumstances, the provision 
of assistance through the Scheme for 
the destruction of long term assets 
such as vine stocks appears to be an 
inappropriate policy ... The recovery in 
export prices in the season preceding the 
implementation of the scheme, and the 
resultant low participation rate in the 
Scheme could, perhaps, be fortuitous.22
Then and now
But to what extent are the two situations—then 
and now—comparable? And what lessons, if any, 
can be derived from the experience in the 1980s? 
Of course, the two schemes are different: in the 
1985–87 VPS, the Commonwealth gave funds to 
the state governments to pay farmers to pull out 
vines (initially clear-fell, then selectively). On the 
other hand, the WRAA is a more sophisticated 
instrument of convincing people out of grape 
production, with the help of the upgraded 
Deloitte Ready Reckoner and Vinebiz accounting 
programs coupled with the proposed exit packages 
from government suggested as point 4 of the 
WRAA (above).
Despite this, the most immediate similarity 
between the two schemes is that as well as being 
aimed at restructuring the industry, they both have 
a welfare component. But the welfare component 
of 1985–87 VPS was aimed (although it did not 
eventually reach) those producers who relied 
solely upon grape production as their means of 
income—in fact, this cohort turned out to be 
relatively small. On the other hand, the welfare 
component of the current WRAA is clearly aimed 
at the financial sustainability of larger producers, 
against what the CEO of the WFA referred to 
as the ‘white shoe brigade’ of producers—who 
are by no means individuals who have retired to 
grape growing, they are just the smaller players 
in regions assessed as marginal on the basis of 
grape production only. These players may well 
have other sources of income (on-farm and off-
farm) and may well be contributing to the overall 
economic regeneration of some marginal regions 
in the country. Nevertheless, the WRAA is clearly 
aimed at persuading them to stop growing grapes 
for wine production. Yet these individuals could 
The Commonwealth was also 
subsidising the viticultural ‘lifestyle’ 
and ‘hobby’ farms of  some urban 
and rural professionals.
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simply be enjoying growing grapes, drinking 
their own booze, and selling a few bottles to their 
friends. Whatever they’re doing, it really isn’t the 
business of the WFA, the WGGA, the AWBC, 
or the GWRDC. Nor is it the role of taxpayers 
to assist them out of the industry if they choose 
to exit.
The second similarity is that the proposed 
WRAA is nothing short of radical government 
intervention into commodity production in 
Australia. Although the WFA spruiks the idea 
that the industry is helping itself, the reality is that 
both the AWBC and the GWRDC are statutory 
corporations of the Commonwealth. As such, it 
may not be Commonwealth or state ministry that 
is prescribing policy in this instance, but it is still 
these organisations designing and delivering the 
agenda, then informing elected governments (or 
‘brief[ing] Federal and State primary industry 
ministers … four days before the statement’s 
release and the State associations since brief[ing] 
relevant authorities.’23
The third similarity follows from this. Just 
because it is a restructured regulatory environment 
does not entail that this kind of intervention into 
commodity production won’t be subject to the 
systemic problems of intervention into the market. 
Nor does the proposed WRAA guarantee against 
different, although no less perverse, outcomes 
witnessed as a result of the 1985–87 VPS. These 
outcomes showed that assistance programs in 
agriculture are notoriously difficult to design 
and that particular attention needs to be paid to 
designing criteria and ease of implementation. 
Moreover, to implement the WRAA as envisioned 
by the WFA and others would negate the principle 
that has seen the growth of the industry for the 
last 20 years, namely, that of minimal government 
interference.
Market solutions
So what should be done about the industry’s 
problems—particularly oversupply?
This question is pertinent not only to the 
larger (corporate) producers but also for the 
disparate regions around the country that now 
enjoy the benefits of wine production as part of 
their local milieu. In this regard, and contradicting 
the claims of the WRAA Supporting Report, the 
industry is responding to market signals. The 
same ABS category that witnessed the meteoric 
growth in the industry now records that the total 
grape crush for 2008–09 dropped by 5.4% on the 
previous year, coinciding with a 5.9% decrease 
in overall literage. Moreover, the sky hasn’t fallen 
in on the export front: Sales rose by 5.2% and 
domestic sales also rose slightly.24
This does not deny that the wine industry 
faces the systemic problems noted earlier. It does, 
however, caution against clumsy intervention.
As well, other steps can be taken within a 
market framework. Even ABARE has made 
specific recommendations in this regard.25 These 
include exploring different business models, 
recasting the relationships between grape growers 
and winemakers, additional investment in R&D, 
and market expansion via in-country promotion.
These solutions require a lot of hard work but 
are far better for the long term prospects of the 
industry and its consumers.
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